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Abstract
Many of the communication protocols developed for the resource constrained devices are rarely subjected to protocol veriﬁcation.
Design ﬂaws like deadlocks, livelocks, non-progressive cycles etc. may come into view during the realization and can cause
catastrophic eﬀects in safety-critical applications. Formal speciﬁcation of the protocol represented as a model helps to describe and
analyse the conformability of the implementation to its speciﬁcation and subsequently reveal design ﬂaws, if any in the system.
The formal model is subject to veriﬁcation by inserting correctness and safety properties of the protocol and validating logical
correctness using a model checking tool. All model checkers suﬀer from state explosion problem due to enormous states of the
model being created. The key contribution of the present work is the introduction of a method to develop a compact veriﬁcation
model which is amenable to full state space search by abstracting the key elements of a protocol. Moreover, many protocol
veriﬁcation works presented in the existing literature consider only a single layer of a communication protocol. To correctly model
the overall behaviour of a protocol, interactions between the layers have to be incorporated. The proposed method has been proven
useful by considering veriﬁcation of an application protocol, CoAP for constrained devices by abstracting out the aspects of the
underlying routing protocol RPL. Reliable message exchanges among various entities are modeled and its safety and correctness
properties were analysed and veriﬁed. The results obtained show that the model performs the full state space search by considering
all possible routing paths and are free from design ﬂaws. The method described has been implemented by building a validation
model in PROMELA and the model is veriﬁed by using SPIN model checker. The methodology used in this paper can be used to
verify any application layer protocol for constrained devices in IoT scenario that run on top of routing layer.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICACC 2016.
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1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) consists of millions of IP connected smart devices interacting and communicating with
each other over the web. The exponential increase in the sensor assisted applications put new demands on continuous
sharing of information at global scale. It is expected that by 2020 there will be 50 billion of connected things1 and
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communication protocols play a major role. The development of communication protocols are usually start from
the RFC documents where the speciﬁcations given in these are mapped into implementation directly using a suitable
programming language. Such protocols deployed on devices may result in failure during later stages of execution due
to the design ﬂaws. These ﬂaws can only be identiﬁed and addressed by performing formal veriﬁcation during the
development. Formal veriﬁcation of protocols include building models from its speciﬁcations followed by inserting
properties that are to be veriﬁed into the model in the form of temporal claims, assertions and monitors. This is then
fed to a model checker that performs an exhaustive search of all possible sequence of execution paths that matches
with the negation of the speciﬁcation properties. For any execution path that matches with the negated property spec-
iﬁcation, model checker generates a violating trace showing execution path that leads to property violation. Every
execution path generated by the model checker is maintained as a sequence of execution states in system memory.
The number of states generated by the model checker grows exponentially with respect to the size of the model. This
may lead to state explosion problem resulting memory overﬂow. Hence, the size of the model should be minimized
without losing core properties of the protocol. The constrained devices used in IoT applications make use of Routing
Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL)2 proposed by IETF at the routing layer for multi hop communi-
cation. RPL protocol constructs a direct acyclic graph(DAG) based on some objective function. Formal veriﬁcation
of application layer protocol for constrained devices requires interaction with routing layer. Modeling RPL for veriﬁ-
cation of application layer protocol leads to increase in the size of the model which results in state explosion.
Fig. 1. Proposed Veriﬁcation System
This paper proposes a method to abstract out routing characteristics for the veriﬁcation of application layer proto-
cols for constrained devices in IoT. The overall outline of the proposed concept is depicted in Figure 1. By using this
proposed method, veriﬁcation of an application layer protocol namely Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for
constrained devices is attempted. Protocol is modeled using PROMELA3 and is veriﬁed by SPIN5 model checker.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes related works. Proposed design methodology for formal
veriﬁcation of CoAP is presented in Section III. The design elements of CoAP are discussed in Section IV. The Mod-
eling and formal veriﬁcation of CoAP incorporating proposed routing strategy is presented in Section V. Conclusion
and future works are discussed in section VI.
2. Related Works
Various software tools, methods and proposals designed to improve quality of routing protocols using formal ver-
iﬁcation techniques are presented in6. The work also present various types of formal veriﬁcation techniques, the
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problem of state explosion and its solution, an algorithm for formal veriﬁcation and its illustration by modeling the
various protocols using PROMELA. Various techniques involved in the veriﬁcation of correctness properties for com-
munication protocols based on ﬁnite state machines are depicted in7,8. The work also suggest diﬀerent types of design
ﬂaws that are identiﬁed and addressed by formal veriﬁcation. A systematic framework used for choosing modeling
languages for cyber physical systems is presented in9. The framework describes the selection of modeling tool based
on stakeholders view, type of formalism used. It also suggests language tools like SPIN, UPPAAL10 and NuSMV for
the veriﬁcation of models based on ﬁnite state machine and hybrid automaton.
The key concepts involved in model checking, description of SPIN model checker, tools used for demonstrating
concurrency, nondeterminism are described in11. Classiﬁcation of model checkers consisting of explicit state model
checkers, bounded model checkers, constraint satisfaction model checkers and symbolic model checkers are pre-
sented in12. It also describes various temporal languages like LTL,CTL etc for property speciﬁcation. The various
ways in which the design ﬂaws of a protocol can be identiﬁed and addressed are explained using a simple proto-
col for distributed systems presented in13. An attempt to compare the performance of bitstate hashing method with
other hashing techniques for eﬃcient state space search is presented in14. A method to derive UIO sequence from
PROMELA speciﬁcation for the solution of conformance test problem was presented in15. A method to integrate tim-
ing elapsed between events was suggested in16. The eﬀectiveness of the above method was analysed and compared
by incorporating timing features in PAR and BRP protocols.
An algorithm for building an abstract model for protocols related to mobile ad-hoc networks was described in17.
The algorithm described was validated for LAR, DREAM and OLSR ad-hoc routing protocols. A technique used
for the veriﬁcation of Wireless Adaptive Routing Protocol(W.A.R.P) using SPIN was described in18. Modeling and
veriﬁcation of DVR protocol using SPIN was depicted in19. Veriﬁcation of DHCP protocol starting from abstracting
of design elements and its behavior was described and safety properties were analyzed using SPIN in20. The mes-
saging frame work for EAP protocol was modeled and the basic safety properties of the protocol were analyzed in21.
Collision avoidance protocol was modeled and veriﬁed using SPIN and UPPAAL model checkers in22 and its safety
properties were analyzed. FTSP (Flooding Time Synchronization Protocol) was modeled using PROMELA and ver-
iﬁed using SPIN in23. The Safety properties pertaining to time synchronization of FTSP were veriﬁed and analyzed
using LTL.
The Evolution and standardization of various protocols with a view to support IoT were described in24. It also
propose a standardized protocol stack for constrained devices using IEEE 802.15.425 PHY layer and MAC layer
, 6LOWPAN26, RPL/ROLL27 for network layer, UDP for transport layer and CoAP28 for application layer. An
overview about CoAP and its standardization by CoRE (Constrained RESTful Environment) is discussed in29. This
work describes the interoperability between a constrained environment with the traditional internet environment using
HTTP and CoAP protocol stacks. The performance of CoAP and HTTP in terms of energy consumption, response
time and bytes transferred per transaction was analyzed in30.
The literature review shows that only few works were focusing on veriﬁcation of IoT protocols. Many works
related with protocol veriﬁcation was done by considering message exchanges within the same layer. Modeling the
protocol behavior for cross layer communication is vital for IoT protocols. Hence a veriﬁcation method for application
layer protocol (CoAP) by abstracting its interaction with routing layer for constrained devices communicating through
multiple hops is proposed. This paper focuses mainly on a method to abstract out routing layer for the veriﬁcation of
CoAP.
3. Proposed design Methodology
Multi hop communications are inevitable for smart devices due to their limited range. It is required to incorporate
the characteristics of multi hop routing for performing formal veriﬁcation of application layer protocols. In this paper
routing concepts are embedded into the application layer protocol by constructing all the possible routing paths that
exist among nodes. A seperate veriﬁcation covering all possible paths has been performed for destination nodes con-
taining multiple paths. The proposed derivation of routing information and veriﬁcation of CoAP protocol are based
on the extracting the design elements of protocols as suggested in4. Consider the topology described in Figure 2 .
For the veriﬁcation of CoAP node 0 is considered as source node. The possible paths between source (nodes 0) and
the node with the highest level (node 8) are as shown below. Path 1 ->0-1-5-8 (3 hops), Path 2 ->0-1-5-7-8 (4 hops),
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Fig. 2. Multihop Topology
path 3 ->0-3-5-8 (3 hops), path 4 ->0-3-5-7-8 (4 hops) and Path 5 ->0-4-6-7-8 (4 hops). Separate routing information
are constructed for each path. Here ﬁve routing matrices are required to store the routing information along the ﬁve
diﬀerent paths. The routing information is maintained as a MxM matrix for topology consisting of M nodes. The
algorithm for updating routing matrices are depicted in Algorithm 1. Applying algorithm on the multi hop topology
Algorithm 1 Routing Table Construction Algorithm
1.For each destination node j , 1 <= j >= n,compute the path Pj = r1,r2,...rk that exist from source node 0 to j.
2. For each path in set Pj repeat the following steps
2.1.Let r1 be a path consisting of q11,q12, q13 ...ql be the set of nodes contained in one of the path of destination node
j.
2.1.1. Set Routing matrix[q11,q12]=q12, and Routing matrix[q12,q11]=q11.
Set Routing matrix[q12,q13]=q13, and Routing matrix[q13,q12]=q12,
..
Set Routing matrix[qk−1,qk]=qk, and Set Routing matrix[qk,qk−1]=qk−1.
3. If there exists one path in Pj update all the routing matrices.
4. If there are ’m’ multiple paths then update ’m’ routing matrices with each element in Pj along ’m’ paths.
shown in Figure 2 result in the path obtained from each destination nodes and are as follows.
P1={0↔ 1}, P2={0↔ 2}, P3={0↔ 3}, P4={0↔ 4}, P5={q1 = 0↔ 1↔ 5, q2 = 0↔ 3↔ 5}, P6={0↔ 4↔ 6},
P7={q1 = 0 ↔ 1 ↔ 5 ↔ 7, q2 = 0 ↔ 3 ↔ 5 ↔ 7, q3 = 0 ↔ 4 ↔ 6 ↔ 7}, P8={q1 = 0 ↔ 1 ↔ 5 ↔ 8, q2 = 0 ↔
3↔ 5↔ 8, q3 = 0↔ 4↔ 6↔ 7↔ 8, q4 = 0↔ 1↔ 5↔ 7↔ 8, q5 = 0↔ 3↔ 5↔ 7↔ 8}
The routing paths constructed as per Algorithm 1 by considering two paths from node at lowest level (node 0) to
highest level (node 8) are shown in Table 1-2. The routing information for the other three paths from node 0 to node
8 can be constructed in the same way.
4. Design Elements of CoAP
The design elements of CoAP are evolved from RFC 725228 and are based on the concepts described in4
a) SERVICE Speciﬁcation
It is a protocol used for web transfer among constrained devices and connected via internet. CoAP implements a
RESTful environment for constrained devices. RESTful nature of this protocol is realized by using Request/Response
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Table 1. Routing Table 1
Src
Dest
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 -1 1 2 3 4 1 4 1 1
1 0 -1 0 0 0 5 0 5 5
2 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 -1 0 5 0 5 5
4 0 0 0 0 -1 0 6 6 6
5 1 1 1 3 1 -1 7 7 8
6 4 4 4 4 4 7 -1 7 7
7 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 -1 8
8 5 5 5 5 7 5 7 7 -1
Table 2. Routing Table 2
Src
Dest
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 -1 1 2 3 4 1 4 1 1
1 0 -1 0 0 0 5 5 5 5
2 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 -1 0 5 0 5 5
4 0 0 0 0 -1 0 6 6 6
5 1 1 1 3 1 -1 7 7 7
6 4 4 4 4 4 7 -1 7 7
7 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 -1 8
8 7 5 5 5 7 5 7 7 -1
architecture. CoAP assumes every smart objects used in IoT as a list of URIs. Here a client request a particular service
from a RESTfull server by specifying the URI. The services include sensing and actuation. The server responds to the
client via replay message. A particular server can handle several requests and services. The protocol should provide
reliable service that can withstand link failures.
b) ASSUMPTION about environment
i).The components involved are CoAP Clients that request the service to the CoAP server by specifying its URI
followed by service speciﬁcation. The request can be cached through intermediate nodes that act as proxy.
ii). The transmission channels are full duplex, wireless and lossy.
iii). Transport layer protocol used is UDP.
iv). Network and MAC layer used are 6LOWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4.
c) VOCABULARY
CoAP supports the following messages.
i). GET : Used to retrieve the resource speciﬁed by the URI-path
ii). PUT : Used to Update or actuate speciﬁc bits / devices identiﬁed by URI-path.
iii).DELETE : Used to remove a speciﬁc service from the device identiﬁed by URI-path.
iv). POST : Used to create a speciﬁc URI path for later use.
v). ACK : It is the message issued from the server side in response to a conﬁrmable message.
vi). RST: If the message is unable to process by the server it will responds with a RST message indication that mes-
sage can’t be processed.
d) FORMAT
Format of CoAP frame is shown in Figure 3 Version (Ver): 2-bit unsigned integer, the CoAP version number it is
set to 1 (01 binary).
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Fig. 3. CoAP Frame28
Type (T): 2-bit unsigned integer indicating message types.
Code: 8-bit unsigned integer. indicating the type of message request and response.
e) PROCEDURE RULES
1. A CoAP client can sent any one of the following message types which may be either a conﬁrmable (CON) or
Non-Conﬁrmable (NON)
1.1 GET, POST, PUT & DELETE. Client will retransmit the same message if it doesn’t receive the ACK within the
ACK timeout interval for CON message.Client will also perform retransmission if it doesn’t receive any response for
NON messages.
1.2 Number of retransmission from the client side will be limited to maximum retransmission limit speciﬁed by the
protocol.
2. When a server receives a conﬁrmable message described in rule 1.1 it can respond either by sending a piggybacked
response with ACK , response code, payload and message-ID or as a separate response with ACK, response code and
message-id without payload.
2.1 In case of separate response server initially sends ACK with response code 0.00 indicting that the response will
be send at later time. When the server is free it will send a CON message with payload and code 2.05 and its token
speciﬁed in CON request received earlier.
2.1.1 If the server do not receive a client response in lieu of the ACK message with code 0.00 send in rule 2.1 within
a stipulated time the server retransmits the same message.
3. When a server receives a NON message it responds with a response code followed by payload if response is
positive.
4. When a client receives a separate response for a CON message, the client sends an ACK with response code 0.00.
5. Modelling and Formal veriﬁcation of CoAP
5.1. Validation Model for CoAP
A validation model for CoAP was built by using PROMELA. The model abstract out the procedural rules with
emphasis given to the CON message sequence associated with GET. This is due to similarity of external behavior
that exists among other conﬁrmable messages. The model follows the topology described in Figure 2. The routing
behavior was incorporated in accordance with the routing path construction algorithm described in section III. The
external message sequence interaction among various nodes of the model generated by using SPIN model checker is
depicted in Figure 4 Which describes the message sequence interaction
Here a CON GET message is sent from node 0 to node 8 and its corresponding piggybacked ACK from node 8
to node 0. The process id ( pid) assigned by the model checker for node 0, node 1, node 5, node 7 and node 8 in-
volved in message exchanges are 1,2,6,8 and 9 respectively. The path chosen by the model in accordance with Table 2.
5.2. Formal Veriﬁcation of CoAP
The formal veriﬁcation was done for a set of nine nodes as per the topology described in Figure 2. Here node 0
was considered as client node and all other nodes treated as server nodes. The properties are inserted in the validation
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Fig. 4. Scenario/Sequence Diagram
model and are veriﬁed for message interaction between client node and other server nodes separately. The veriﬁcation
was done using bit state hashing and maximum search depth was limited up to 252. The properties that are veriﬁed in
the model have full state space coverage. Various properties inserted in the model are described below.
Property 1:When a CON GET message is send to any of the destination node it will eventually reach the server
node.
The LTL corresponding to this property is described as follows.
ltl p1 ( []<>S ->[]<>C )
S is a boolean variable that will be set to true in the model whenever a message is received from client. Another
boolean variable C is set to true in the model whenever a client sent a message to any destination node. The equivalent
nevr claim for the LTL is given in Listing1
( []<>S ->[]<>C ) is
Listing 1. Never Claim for Property 1
never { / ∗ ( []<> ( S ) −> []<> (C ) ) ∗ /
T 0 i n i t :
do
: : ( (C ) ) −> goto a c c ep t S10
: : ( 1 ) −> goto T0 S10
: : ( ! ( ( S ) ) ) −> goto a c c ep t S26
: : ( 1 ) −> goto T0 S23
od ;
a c c ep t S10 :
do
: : ( 1 ) −> goto T0 S10
od ;
a c c ep t S26 :
do
: : ( ! ( ( S ) ) ) −> goto a c c ep t S26
od ;
T0 S10 :
do
: : ( (C ) ) −> goto a c c ep t S10
: : ( 1 ) −> goto T0 S10
od ;
T0 S23 :
do
: : ( ! ( ( S ) ) ) −> goto a c c ep t S26
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: : ( 1 ) −> goto T0 S23
od ;
}
The results obtained after verifying this property using Table 2 was described in Table 3. The results suggest that the
Table 3. Veriﬁcation Result: Property 1
Destination Depth Searched Hash Factor State Stored Memory Usage (MB) for States Pan:Rate States/ Second
1 192 657930 204 318 4.359 2266.667
2 192 657930 204 318 4.359 2127
3 192 657930 204 318 4.359 2150
4 192 657930 204 318 4.359 2181.85
5 212 559241 240 376 5.128 1800
6 212 559241 240 376 5.128 2160
7 232 486296 276 434 5.897 2266.667
8 252 430185 312 492 6.666 2080
model checker performs full state space searched and the property is satisﬁed. The veriﬁcation was repeated using all
the remaining routing paths and results show that this property is satisﬁed.
Property 2:Absence of Non-Progressive cycle
The never claim used for checking non-progress cycles is shown in Listing 2.
Listing 2. Never Claim for Property 2
never { / ∗ []<> np ∗ /
T 0 i n i t :
do
: : ( ( np ) ) −> goto a c c e p t S9
: : ( 1 ) −> goto T 0 i n i t
od ;
a c c e p t S9 :
do
: : ( 1 ) −> goto T 0 i n i t
od ;
}
SPIN model checker maintains a reserved in variable named ’np ’ . The value of the variable will be set to true
by the model checker if there are any execution sequence that cycles through unmarked states. Any occurrence of
non-progress cycle causes never claim to cycle through state marked as ’accept S4’. This will violate the property of
absence of non-progress cycles. The veriﬁcation results showing the absence of non-progress cycle for a CON GET
message is as shown in the Table 4.
Table 4. Veriﬁcation Result: Property 2
Destination Depth Searched Hash Factor State Stored Memory Usage (MB) for States Pan:Rate States/ Second
1 192 1.24276e+06 108 127 2.308 2340
2 192 1.24276e+06 108 127 2.308 2127
3 192 1.24276e+06 108 127 2.308 2150
4 192 1.24276e+06 108 127 2.308 2135
5 212 1.04858e+06 128 153 2.735 1600
6 212 1.04858e+06 128 153 2.735 2560
7 232 906877 148 179 3.162 2466.667
8 252 798915 168 205 3.59 1866.667
Property: 3: Absence of deadlock
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This can be veriﬁed by running the PROMELA model without inserting any claims in the analyzer mode. The model
checker ﬂags error if any deadlock occurs. The veriﬁcation result shows that the presence of zero errors and hence
absence of deadlock.
5.3. Results and discussion
The veriﬁcation was carried after exploring full state space search for all the properties. The maximum search
depth reached was 252 and was attained in the communication scenario between nodes belonging to lowest and
highest level in the topology described in Figure 2. Speciﬁcation of CoAP limits the number of communication for
facilitating energy eﬃciency.Hence the number of state transitions occurred in the veriﬁcation was limited. For the
veriﬁcation of application layer protocols that require continuous message exchanges, the number of state transitions
will grow exponentially.
6. Conclusion and Future works
A veriﬁcation model for application layer protocols in IoT considering its interaction with routing layer was pro-
posed. The proposed concept was illustrated by conducting formal veriﬁcation of CoAP running on top of a compact
form of RPL. A validation model for CoAP was built using PROMELA for a multi hop topology. The external be-
havior of the model was analyzed by generating a message sequence chart depicting the message ﬂow between nodes.
This model was veriﬁed by using SPIN model checker covering safety,liveness and correctness properties. The veriﬁ-
cation results were analysed in terms of memory usage,number of state transitions and maximum search depth attained
for all the inserted properties.
The proposed routing path construction can be applied for the veriﬁcation of any application layer protocol for
constrained devices. The basic correctness properties described for CoAP can be extended to include other message
types by incorporating suﬃcient CoAP protocol abstractions. The routing path construction can also be extended to
support dynamic topology changes.
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